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I. INTRODUCTION

While the consumer revolt against auto insurance companies dominates
the news,' the older more detrimental medical malpractice crisis still
remains unresolved. 2 In 1985, the annual national cost of medical mal*Associate, Diehl & Rodewald, San Luis Obispo, California; B.S. 1985, San
Diego State University; J.D. 1989 Pepperdine School of Law.
The author would like to thank Susan Finklestein, Professor Randy Lowry,
Susan Noe, Doug Pinnui, and Janet Schmitt for their valuable contributions to
this draft. The author would also like to thank Frank Heckman, Maria Lerman
Hutkin and Linda Slade for their valuable input and contributions to this article.
Hammer, California'sInsurance War, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 28, 1988, at 10; Waldman, Foote & Williams, The Prop 103 'PrairieFire': California's car-insurance
referendum is only the start of a move to cut rates across the country, NEWSWEEK,
May 15, 1989, at 50.
2 Korcok, "I'll See You in Court": US Still Looking for Malpractice Cure, 138
CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 846 (1988); Sahney, Peters, & Nelson, Health Care Delivery
System: Current Trends & Prospects for the Future, 34 HENRY FORD HOsp. MED.
J. 227, 230 (1986); Permut, Medical Malpractice:Arbitration and Other Potential
Solutions, 58 DEL. MED. J. 463 (1986).
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practice insurance increased to $2.3 billion.3 This was an increase of 46.8%
from 1984 figures. 4 Malpractice insurance costs increased 336% over the
ten year period starting in 1974 and ending in 1984. 5 In many medical
specialties, insurance premiums increased from 50% to 100% in a single
year.6 A recent estimate places the combined costs of insurance premiums,
defensive medicine (utilization of unneeded visits, tests and
procedures),
7
and settlements at an annual cost of $12 to $14 billion.
The rise in the number of malpractice claims filed against doctors is
the primary cause of the sharp increase in insurance premiums. In 1985,
the number of claims filed per 100 doctors rose to 17.8. This figure represents a 57% increase over the 1981 rate." Although most claims deal
with surgical cases, the number of claims against physicians who do not
perform surgery, invasive procedures, or obstetrical procedures swelled
by 100% from 1981 to 1985. 9 These numbers are expected to continue to
increase dramatically in the future. 0
3

Sahney, et. al., supra note 2 at 230.

4Id.
5Id.

6Id. This unabated rise in the cost of malpractice is showing signs of slowing
or even stopping. In several areas, malpractice insurance rates have recently been
reduced. It is too early to make predictions about whether or not this trend will
continue. A number of different factors may have contributed to this change in
malpractice insurance. One factor is that fewer claims are being filed because
fewer plaintiffs' lawyers are accepting contingency fee cases on anything but sure
winners. Furthermore, there has been recent adverse publicity regarding malpractice insurance companies. Freudenheim, Costs of Medical MalpracticeDrop

After
7 an 11-Year Climb, New York Times, June 11, 1989, at 1, col. 1.

Meyers, "Lumping It": The Hidden Denominator of the Medical Malpractice

Crisis,77 AM. J. PunLic HEALTH 1544 (1987). Malpractice premiums paid in other
countries are substantially lower than the high premiums paid in the United
States. For example, in 1986-87, British physicians paid a premium equivalent
to about $950.00. In the same year, New York state medical malpractice premiums
were more than $20,000 per year. Miller, Medical MalpracticeLitigation: Do the
British have a Better Remedy?, 11 AM. J. LAW & MED. 433, 434, 453 (1986).
8
Castellani, Malpractice: Is Competence or Caring In Question?, 77 J. MED.

Assoc. GA. 223 (1988). While the percentage of claims filed against allopathic
physicians (M.D.s) is high, a study performed in Michigan reveals that osteopathic
physicians (D.O.s), who generally spend more time with their patients and have
a different theory of medical treatment, have only one fifth as many claims filed
against them. Powsner & Hamermesh, Why Not Arbitrate?, 85 MICH. MED. 408,
411 (1986).
9Sahney, supra note 2, at 230.
10Castellani, supra note 6, at 223. A recent study by the Minnesota Department
of Commerce challenges these findings. The study analyzed data collected from
two insurers who sell 100% of the physician malpractice insurance in Minnesota,
South Dakota and North Dakota. A total of 4,700 files were reviewed covering
the periods of 1981 - 1987. The study concluded that neither the frequency nor
the severity of the claims has discernably changed over the past six years. Hatch,
Minn. Dept. of Com., Medical MalpracticeClaims Study: 1981 - 1987 31 (1988).

Similarly, a Florida study concluded that the frequency of paid medical malpractice claims, when corrected for the growth in the population, has increased
only slightly. Dewar, Gifford, Nye, & Webb, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice
Crisis: An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO.

L. J. 1495, 1499, 1500 (1988).
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While one might accuse our litigious society as being responsible for
the rise in claims and associated costs, studies reveal that the number of
iatrogenic illnesses and injuries, i.e., conditions caused by medical treatment, is large. In a study of 815 consecutive admissions to a teaching
hospital, 290, or 36% of the patients displayed evidence of at least one
iatrogenic illness." Other hospital studies have found similar results. 2
Since these studies are based solely on a review of hospital records, one
is led to wonder how many iatrogenic illnesses or injuries take place in
the outpatient or long-term care setting.
With the rapid increase in claims,"3 their skyrocketing costs, 14 and the

realization that the health care system is in a crisis, thought must be
given as to how malpractice claims might be prevented or more efficiently
managed. The following questions need to be asked in order to effectively
address the malpractice crisis: how can the quality of medical care improve?; how should malpractice claims be handled?; what remedies should
be provided?; and how can the system be made more responsive to the
needs of the parties?
This article will review the societal and individual costs of the present
medical malpractice system, analyze current efforts to reform the system,
and propose several alternatives for consideration. These alternatives
include expanding the use of alternative dispute resolution, reformulating
the doctor/patient relationship, expanding the scope of conventional hospital risk management and modifying the manner in which medical malpractice insurance is presently provided.
II.

"COSTS" OF THE CURRENT MALPRACTICE SYSTEM

The conspicuous "costs" of the medical malpractice system, both financial and emotional, arise primarily from litigation. The financial costs,
such as fees for lawyers, are directly or indirectly paid by both parties.
Doctors and hospitals pay litigation costs through high malpractice insurance premiums' 5 and patients pay these costs through higher medical
11Meyers, supra note 7, at 1544.
12Id.
13See supra note 10, for two studies that challenge this conclusion.
14A study conducted in Florida concluded that the substantial increase

in loss
payments to claimants was the main reason the cost of malpractice insurance
has skyrocketed. Exorbitant profits by the insurance company were not found to
be the cause of the high cost of malpractice insurance. Dewar, et. al. supra note
10, at 1499, 1515. A contrary conclusion was reached in a recent Minnesota study.
The Minnesota study found that:
[i]t is obvious that insurers are charging considerably higher rates
than are necessary to cover losses and expenses and also realize a
healthy profit .... Despite unchanging claim frequency and declining
loss payments and loss expense, on average, physicians paid approximately triple the amount of premiums for malpractice insurance in
1987 than in 1982.
Hatch, supra note 10, at 31.
"r While the cost of malpractice insurance may be spiraling, the percentage of
gross income spent by doctors on malpractice insurance has remained roughly
the same for a decade, at less than four percent of income. Whelan, Litigation
and Complaints Procedures:Objectives, Effectiveness and Alternatives, 14 J. MED.
ETHcs. 70, 73 (1988).
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bills.'6
The emotional and psychological costs of litigation are also very high.'
While lawsuits emotionally burden both parties, they are especially troubling to physicians. Physicians tend to view malpractice suits as personal
attacks on their competence. 18 Studies show that being sued for malpractice is a major life stress for most physicians. Many physicians develop
transient emotional symptoms, such as depression and anxiety. 19 Physicians have even retired or committed suicide in response to malpractice
claims against them. 20
While the conspicuous financial and emotional costs are large, the hidden costs of the malpractice crisis make it especially detrimental to our
society. These costs include the following: decrease in availability of malpractice insurance; increase in insurance premiums; increase in use of
defensive medicine; fear of new techniques and technologies; erosion of
the physician/patient relationship; and reduced availability of physician
services in specific specialities and geographic areas.2 '
One example of the reduced availability of physician services occurred
recently in Florida. Physicians protesting spiraling malpractice premiums went on strike, "closing down some emergency rooms and forcing
others to operate with skeleton staffs. '22 This situation was described as
the "Beirut of American Health Care." The ill or injured had to rely on
the paramedics and hope that they knew which emergency facilities were
still open.' 3 Under these circumstances the human "cost" of the malpractice crisis was quickly felt by those in need.
16Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 972-73 (1979); Henderson, Agreements Changing the
Forum for Resolving Malpractice Claims, 49 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

243, 243-44 (Spring 1986).
17Mnookin,

supra note 14, at 972.
,8Wilbert, Charles, Warneck & Lichtenberg, Coping with the Stress of Malpractice Litigation, 171 ILL. MED. J. 23, 25 (1987).
19Id. at 23; See generally, Fokes, You and MalpracticeStress: III. Two Spouses'
View A Kernel of Social Value?, 75 J. MED. Assoc. GA. 723 (1986); H.C. Snider,
JURY OF MY PEERS: A SURGEON'S ENCOUNTER WITH THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS
(1989).
20In one sad case, a seventy-two year old general practitioner, who had never
before been sued, felt so degraded and dishonored by the process of a lawsuit he
killed himself. Fokes, You and Malpractice Stress v. A Death in the Family, 76 J.
MED.Assoc. GA. 115 (1987).
21 Meyers, supra note 5, at 1544. One illustration of the impact medical malpractice has had on physician services is that "nearly 90% of all practicing OB's
[obstetricians] can expect a lawsuit in their professional lifetime, and that has
led many of them to quit delivering babies. Nearly a quarter of them have quit
in just the past eight years. Most of these doctors are under 45, and the most
common reason they give for leaving obstetrics is the threat of a malpractice
lawsuit." 60 Minutes: Sue the Doctors, [hereinafter 60 Minutes: Sue the Doctors]
(CBS television broadcast, May 7, 1989). The National Academy of Sciences will
soon issue a report that will say that the United States is facing a critical shortage
of obstetricians "that will result in inadequate services for pregnant American
women, especially the poor." Id.
22 Korcok, supra note 2, at 846.
-Id.
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Defensive medicine is another product of the malpractice crisis. Defensive medicine is the use of tests, procedures, and office visits which normally would not be ordered but for the fear of litigation. 24 The result is
high medical costs for both the patient and society. Medical services recommended strictly for defensive reasons are estimated to cost from three
2
to five billion dollars each year.

5

Another product of the medical malpractice crisis is the erosion of the
doctor/patient relationship. Doctors start to view patients as potential
litigants, and consequently start to appear uncaring and aloof to the
patient. The patient may sense this aloofness and be less open with the
physician. This results in poor medical care because the most "useful
information in a medical encounter is gathered through a doctor/patient
relationship based on trust rather than doubt.

'26

In short, the societal and individual costs of the present medical malpractice system are unacceptably high. The costs are destructive to society
and necessitate change in our current approach to medical malpractice.
If the system is not changed, the "costs" and their tragic impact on those
inside and outside the medical field will continue to rise.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIM

Surprisingly, few people who believe they or a close relative have suffered an iatrogenic illness or injury ever discuss their experiences with
an attorney. In 1987, 249 adult residents from Maine were surveyed
regarding public perceptions of iatrogenic illness and injury.27 Approximately twenty-six percent of those surveyed indicated that they or a close
relative had been harmed by medical treatment, yet only seven percent
of them (three people) discussed their experiences with an attorney.2 8 The
study found that generally patients first discuss such injuries with health
care professionals, and the professional who caused the injury. Those
29
patients who later informed their attorneys did so by circuitious paths.
Thus, contrary to the stereotypical patient, many do0not pursue a legal
claim. Instead they live with their iatrogenic injury.3

One widely cited example of defensive medicine is the caesarean section.
The caesarean section is now the most frequently performed major hospital surgery; more than one million a year are performed in the United States. Doctors
often perform caesarean sections as defensive measures to avoid potential lawsuits
that are more likely to follow a vaginal birth. 60 Minutes: Sue the Doctors, supra
note 21.
Permut, supra note 2, at 463-64.
26

Id. at 464.

27Meyers, supra note 7, at 1545.
28Id. at 1547. Those surveyed indicated

a number of different reasons for not
contacting an attorney, including the feeling that the injury was not serious
enough to merit a lawsuit, concerns over the cost of litigation, the low probability
of a favorable outcome, and a general dislike for lawyers. Id.
Id. Whelan, supra note 15, at 73.
30Meyers, supra note 7, at 1544.
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The health care industry and its insurance companies have pointed to
the high percentage of patients who decide to live with their iatrogenic
injury as the basis for their approach to malpractice. For example, the
health care providers and insurers hope the potential problem resolves
itself and wait passively until a Notice of Intent to Sue is received.3' The
fatal flaw in this "wait and see" approach is the detrimental impact that
malpractice has had on society. Although only a small percentage of
people do sue, this litigation has had a disproportionate effect on the
health care system. The physician/patient relationship must be examined
in order to understand why some people decide to file lawsuits.
A. The Patient'sPerspective
People go to the doctor when they are "ill." "Illness" is comprised of
physical, emotional, societal, and cultural components. 32 The ill or sick
person is not at fault for being sick, but is expected to work toward getting
better. To achieve this goal of wellness, the sick person is compelled to
obtain and cooperate with "expert" advice. This expert advice is generally
given by a physician.

3

A sick person wants to know more than just what is physically wrong.
Classically, the sick person "wants to know why he is sick, how he and
his family will manage complex treatments, how much discomfort will
be involved ... , when, and if, he can return to a normal lifestyle, and

how he will pay for treatment."3 4 In addition, the patient may be concerned
with "events that are missed and obligations left unfulfilled as a result
of the sickness."3 5
An individual becomes a patient upon seeking treatment. As a patient,
he is met with "unaccustomed feelings of fright, dependence, neediness,
precariousness, and insecurity - feelings that are generally either kept
under control or disregarded.."36 "Even before their initial meeting, patients have formed an intense bond with the doctor, engendered by a
positive transference-readiness that is rooted in infancy, re-evoked by
illness, and fed by hopeful expectations ... ."37 Patients come to view
doctors as "gods," and this god-like persona increases the patient's trust.
Trust and unswerving confidence in the physician's ability to heal has a
placebo effect. It also makes the patient feel comfortable enough to openly
confide in the physician. However, the danger in this god-like belief in
31Telephone interview with Susan Finklestein, Professional Risk Management
Group, San Diego, California (Jan. 27, 1989) [hereinafter Finklestein].
12 Comment, Healing Angry Wounds: The Roles of Apology and Mediation in
Disputes Between Physiciansand Patients, 1987 J. DisPuTE RESOLUTION 111, 113
(1987).
3 P.CONRAD & R. KERN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF HEALTH AND ILLNESS 123 (2d ed.

1986).

-1 Comment, supra note 32, at 114 [footnotes omitted].
35 Id.
361d.

37Id.
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the doctor is that it is often accompanied by unreasonable expectations.
Patients feel "that all diseases should be treatable, all disabilities reparable.""
B. The Physician'sPerspective
39
Physicians tend to view patients through the "broken machine model."
Health care professionals use various methods to gather information from
the patient. Physicians then label or diagnose the problem, and prescribe
treatments to cure it. The detached vantage point of the "broken machine
model" is helpful in that it allows the physician to concentrate on the

symptoms presented and to ignore outside stimuli. 40 Consequently, the

emergency room doctor is not impaired by the thoughts of the patient's
wife, children, and mortgage, while he works to save the patient's life.
Physicians must deal with several issues not commonly appreciated by
patients. First, there is much which is still unknown about the human
body. Second, the diagnostic process is not always easy, and therefore,
mistakes are common. Finally, the field of medicine is not an exact science.4 1 Such factors create a level of uncertainty, yet the physician cannot
consider them while providing treatment because of the patient's need
for assurance.
In addition to ignoring these factors, patients are unaware of the huge
impact that medical corporations ("health factories"), insurance companies, and medicare42 have had on patient care. As medical costs have
skyrocketed so has the number of prepaid health plans and health organizations. Today, over half of all doctors work in some type of group
practice. 43 The majority of these doctors work for health maintenance
organizations (HMOs). While enrolling in an HMO has benefitted both
physicians and patients, it also has had its drawbacks:

Gibbs, Sick and Tired, TIME, July 31, 1989, at 49.
9The "broken machine model" is an approach used by physicians where they
only consider the patient's symptoms and do not consider the effects of these
symptoms on the patient's personal life style. Comment, supra note 32, at 117.
40Comment, supra note 30, at 116-17.
41

Recently, the fact that medicine is an inexact science was well illustrated.

In the span of a single week, researchers found that two approved medical therapies, one for irregular heartbeats and the other for treatment of enlarged pros-

tates have killed a large number of the patients; patients these treatments were

supposed to help. As more and more medical records are placed on computers,
it is predicted that more flawed therapies and drugs will appear. The Imperfect
Art of Healing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 8, 1989. at 10.
42The medicare system has provided strict guidelines regarding the reimbursement of certain treatments. Insurance companies are often as strict as medicare in their guidelines for reimbursement.
4 Gibbs, supra note 38, at 50.
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Patients relinquish much of their freedom to choose who will
treat them, and can be lost in a shuffle between rotating doctors. The physicians, meanwhile, are transformed from professionals into employees, with a duty to serve not only the
interests of the patients but the demands of the corporation as
well .... Many doctors can no longer decide how often they

see a patient, when one can be hospitalized, or even what drugs
may be prescribed. Those decisions are now in the hands of
third parties, hands that have never touched the patients directly."
The quality of care provided under prepaid health plans/organizations
suffers due to cost considerations. "On the one hand, doctors urge the
most prudent care without regard to the bill, and, on the other hand, forprofit businesses, such as HMOs, watch cost closely out of economic selfinterest.."45 The more the HMO can contain the cost of health care, the
more money it will make. Many HMOs offer bonuses and other incentives
to doctors who reduce costs by ordering fewer tests and making fewer
referrals.

46

In addition, the time pressures placed on physicians who work for HMOs
and the anonymous quality of treatment prevent the creation of a strong
physician/patient relationship. 47 Similarly, the level and quality of communication between the physician and patient is decreased. As discussed
later in this paper, the communication and the relationship between the
physician and patient are integral factors in determining whether a medical malpractice claim will be filed or not.
C. The Clash of Perspectives
There is a great likelihood that conflict and anger will result when
doctor, patient, and in some cases when the viewpoints of a health care
organization come together." The patient who has sought help may find
Id. at 505-51; In 1987, a Maryland HMO provided an excellent example of
the effect an HMO can have on health care. In that case, one-third of the obstetricians affiliated with the HMO quit in protest over a new policy instituted by
the HMO. This policy decreased the doctor's fees, if they ordered excessive tests
for their patients. The HMO also was criticized for prohibiting members from
using certain hospitals which did not grant discounts to the HMO. Abramowitz,
Obstetricians Quit Over HMO's Fee Plan, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 12, 1987, at

10.
"Forbes, Cut Health Costs, Get Sued?, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, July 1986, at 38.
- Id.

Interestingly, experts have stated that the largest hurdle to HMO acceptance
was the reluctance of patients to terminate longstanding relationships with their
family doctors. Arnold, After a Sluggish Start, Georgia HMOs Flourish,ATLANTA
Bus. CHRONICLE, Jan. 27, 1986, § 1, at 10.
This paper's model of the physician-patient relationship is somewhat inaccurate as it ignores the significant role that social workers, nurses, clergy, patient
advocates, and others play in defusing anger and preventing malpractice claims.
Telephone interview with Linda Slade, Lead Social Worker - Clinical Counseling
Services, Sharp Memorial Hospital in San Diego, California (Jan. 23, 1989) [hereinafter Slade].
41
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'49
that the health care system is "dehumanizing and anxiety provoking.
The physician stands ready to offer a scientific approach to "fix the machine," often ignoring the patient's subjective experiences and anxieties.
For example, while the illness provokes anxiety in the patient, the physician treats it as ordinary and routine. The patient may conclude that
the physician's behavior denotes a lack of caring about the patient's welfare.50 This clash of perspectives is well illustrated by a recent Newsweek
article in which the author describes her treatment for breast cancer:
I wanted to be treated as a human being, not as the owner of
a defective breast. Some doctors seem to forget that breastcancer patients have feelings. They prefer to deal with facts,
ma'am, just the facts. They don't seem to realize that these
facts evoke sadness, guilt, insecurity and terror in the woman
hearing them. ...The instant some pathologist, whom you've
never met, looks through a microscope and delivers a verdict
that your tumor is malignant, your life is in the hands of medical professionals, whom in most cases you don't know but
you're supposed to trust. 51
Another illustration of this clash of perspectives appeared in the "Letters
to the Editor" 52 section of a medical journal. One doctor wrote "I've encountered more and more patients over the last several years who are
doctor shopping because they feel that their current physician is hostile
or insensitive or perhaps even employed by the insurance or the Worker's
53
Compensation carrier."
Aggravating an already critical situation is the fact that physician/
patient relationships are often plagued by poor communication. Physicians sometimes feel that they have special knowledge which their patient
cannot understand. 54 Conversely, "[platients today believe it is their right
to know the whole truth about their own bodies, and doctors are no longer
regarded as paternalistic figures dispensing information, like medicine,
at their discretion." 55 Furthermore, patients may be very intimidated and
afraid to ask questions which further compounds the problem. This lack
of communication causes patients to feel disregarded, ignored, patronized,
and dismissed.56
49Comment, supra note 32, at
'oA 1987 survey revealed that

115.
37% of those polled did not believe that doctors
take a genuine interest in their patients. Gibbs, supra note 38, at 49.
-1Kaufman, Cancer: Facts us. Feelings, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 10.
52 Garner, Malpracticeand PatientAlienation, 30 ALASKA MED. 81 (1988).
53Id.
Surprisingly, the "United States is now the most advanced country in the
area of patients' rights." In many countries, doctors still believe it is better not
to tell the patient about a grim diagnosis because the patient will lose any hope
of getting better. For example, deceased Japanese Emperor, Hirohito, was never
told he had cancer. Darton, Whose Life is it, Anyway?, NEWSWEEK,Jan. 23, 1989,
at 61.
5 Id.

Comment, supra note 32, at 121.
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When medical complications or unexpected results occur, physicians
generally make themselves unavailable. This often time angers patients
and causes them to look elsewhere for answers. "The behavior of the
doctor, combined with the preexisting flaws in the health care system's
57
treatment of patients, is the straw that breaks the camel's back.
The patient may seek assistance from people other than the physician,
such as an attorney. "As the physician-patient relationship falters, the
attorney-client relationship strengthens."8 Studies suggest that most patients sue not because their physician was negligent, but because they
are angry or surprised by unanticipated clinical outcomes. 59 Patients become plaintiffs when a poor outcome is coupled with a bad feeling. 60 Suits
are not filed against incompetent physicians but against qualified doctors,
"most of whom have never been sued before and have received excellent
peer review reports. '61 The majority of these claims are resolved in favor
of the doctor or hospital because the patient could not prove legal negligence.

62

D. The Role of Lawyers

It is not surprising that once a lawyer is contacted, the physician/patient
relationship is altered. Lawyers view the physician and patient as adversaries.6 The lawyer's role is that of the "modern-day knight" who will
fight the patient's battle in court.r Lawyers concentrate on the precipitating injury and focus on the elements of a negligence claim, rather than
the true interests of the parties. Aggravating the situation is the fact
that "[1]awyers generally counsel their client to refrain from all direct
contact with the other party, opposing counsel and officers of the court.
In their zeal to protect their client and prepare for litigation, attorneys
forestall any opportunities for apologies and reconciliation."6 5 If the lawyer is victorious, the patient/plaintiff generally receives money damages.
E. Litigation Does Not Address Either Party'sInterests

Today's malpractice litigation process only addresses the monetary interests of those who view malpractice as their path to riches. It fails to
adequately address the societal objectives of the great majority of patients
who file malpractice claims: reparation, emotional vindication, and deterrence.6
Slade, supra note 48.
Kraushar, Malpracticeand the PhysicianPatientRelationship, 13 COMP. THE-

57

ORY 3 (1987).

59
' Heed Consumers on Malpractice to Avoid Suits, HosPrrALs, Sept. 20, 1987,
at 64 [hereinafter Heed Consumers].
Edwards, How to Keep Yourself Out of the Courtroom,83 OH. MED. 391 (1987).
6
Heed Consumers, supra note 59, at 64.
62 1d.
I

Comment, supra note 32, at 128.
'Id.

SId.

Miller, supra note 7, at 435.
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What essentially is a communication problem between two people (doctor and patient) is addressed with money concerns. The
case becomes a battle between the plaintiff's lawyer who wants
his contingency fee and the insurance company and its lawyers
who want to hold onto the money as long as possible. What
brought the patient to the attorney in the first place is generally
67
ignored.
Litigation may soothe the patient's anger, but it cannot eliminate it.
One study68 concluded, "our current approach to medical malpractice
does not perform well. Significant numbers of respondents believe that
they have been neither vindicated nor compensated for their own or their
relatives' illness, injury, or death; and that they have not had the opportunity to protect others from harm."6 9 In essence, the societal interests of
malpractice litigation, reparation, emotional vindication, and deterrence,
must be better addressed.
A further weakness in the litigation approach is its propensity to limit
the parties' creativity and ability to reach a settlement that satisfies both
of their interests.70 Litigation results in a winner and a loser. Thus, while
litigation is the most common approach to malpractice claims, it is clearly
a troublesome approach that fails to meet the objectives of either the
patient/plaintif lY or the physician.
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE LITIGATION MAY BE THE MOST
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE

In some situations litigation cannot be avoided, and may even create
72
substantial benefits as a dispute resolution process:
1. Ego or Anger. When either the doctor or the patient is driven by ego,
spite, or anger, litigation may be necessary. Physicians often find it difficult to settle cases short of trial because they hate to "admit they may
have done something wrong. '73 This ego problem has forced a number of
medical malpractice claims to go to trial which might otherwise have
settled. Patients or members of their families often are motivated by the
desire to punish the physician for an injury or unexpected result.74 "In
some cases suing is the only way they know how to put this matter to
rest. They don't want the money, but rather to punish the doctor and/or
the hospital for what has occurred." 75 Thus, the opportunity to see the
67 Interview with Frank D. Heckman, Senior Vice President, Professional Risk
Management Group., in Long Beach, California (Feb. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Heckman].

See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
supra note 7, at 1547.
70 Heckman, supra note 67.
71Miller, supra note 7, at 453-54.
72
This point is debatable because mini-trials and summary jury trials may
deal better with these situations.
71Miller, supra note 7, at 401.
71Comment, supra note 32, at 122-24.
71Slade, supra note 48.
69 Meyers,
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physician publicly chastised prevents the parties from reaching any
agreement short of trial.
2. Dislike or Fearof Negotiation. Even though litigation is more costly,
the plaintiff/patient may prefer the litigation process to alternative dispute approaches because a third party makes the decisions. Due to a prior
relationship with the physician, the plaintiff/patient often feels incapable
of negotiation - even with lawyers present - on an equal basis with
the physician. The patient/plaintiff may feel intimidated or inhibited by
the presence of the physician and feel a fair agreement cannot be achieved.
3. Calling the "Hand." "Negotiation may resemble a game of 'chicken'
in which two teenagers set their cars on a collision course to see who
turns first. Some crack-ups may result.

' 76

When parties take hard-line

stances in negotiating, the negotiation often escalates. If one party makes
threats, the other party may respond with counter threats. Consequently,
they will probably end up in court.
4. Unknown or Unreasonable Objectives. Sometimes the patient/plaintiff files his/her lawsuit without a clear objective in mind. The patient/
plaintiff may simply be angry and have no specific reason for suing the
physician. In this situation, settlement cannot be reached because the
patient/plaintiff is not working toward any goal. In addition, the parties
to a lawsuit typically overestimate their chances of winning. 77 Hence,
each party expects to win in court and is reluctant to settle prior to trial.
In these situations, litigation may be the best alternative for settling
malpractice claims. Nevertheless, as will be explained later, other methods for settling the dispute should always be tried first.
V. ADVANTAGES OF AVOIDING THE LITIGATION ROUTE
Although the litigation process is appropriate in some circumstances,

the parties obtain obvious and substantial benefits when they avoid this
route. The financial and emotional costs of a malpractice suit are very
high. The costs build quickly whether or not the physician is guilty of
malpractice. Rather than treating patients, the physician must spend
time gathering defense evidence, answering interrogatories, being deposed by the plaintiff~s attorneys, watching depositions of the plaintiffs
expert witnesses, and answering general correspondence.
Given the substantial delays typically found in judicial proceedings,
settlements reached before tria7 8 can save substantial time, money, and
76

Mnookin, supra note 16, at 975.

77 Id.

78In reality, only a small number of malpractice claims actually go to trial.
For example, of 2,000 claims filed yearly against members of the Southern California Physicians Insurance Exchange, 75% are dropped during the investigation
by the Exchange, 17% are settled, and 8% go to trial or arbitration of which
doctors win 85%. Diamond, Arbitration - Just What the Doctor Ordered, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1988, § 4, col. 1, at 1.
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emotional costs. In addition, judges and jurors commonly make errors in
settling disputes.7 9 By reaching settlements prior to trial, the parties can
also avoid the risks and uncertain outcomes of litigation.
Avoiding the courtroom also reduces the reputational losses associated
with being a "defendant" (even a successful defendant) in a public malpractice trial. Whether a malpractice claim has merit or not, the physician's reputation still suffers.
Finally, a consensual agreement or settlement between a physician and
patient is more likely to be consistent with the interests and preferences
of both parties. A consensual agreement is much more likely to mend the
physician/patient relationship than a result forced on the two parties by
the court.80 Physicians are more likely to change their practices following
a negotiated settlement rather than after a publicly humiliating trial.
Under these circumstances, doctors are also more likely to apologize for
any mistakes or unexpected results. Although physicians do not like to
admit they have done something wrong, they might, in retrospect, admit
they should or could have done things differently. 81 When a consensual
agreement is reached, both parties' interests are addressed and both parties come out "winners."
VI. CURRENT EFFORTS TO HANDLE THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS

The medical malpractice crisis has been in existence for some time. A
number of programs have been implemented in order to try and resolve
the crisis. S6me of these efforts have had limited success, while others,
like the litigation approach, have been unsuccessful. The current magnitude of the malpractice crisis is evidence that these programs have
failed to curtail the problem. The following section reviews current efforts
to handle the malpractice crisis.
A. Legislative Reform
Over the past few years, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
issued eleven reports on medical malpractice. 2 According to the GAO,
legislative (tort) reform is the most commonly proposed solution to the
malpractice crisis.8 3 Suggested reforms include:

supra note 16, at 243-44.
Mnookin. supranote 16, at 956.
81Porter, So You're Being Sued ForMalpractice,83 OH. MAED. 395,401-02 (1987).
82U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., Pu. No. HRD-86-5o, Medical Malpractice:No Agreement
on the Problems or Solutions at 13 (1986) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., PuB.
No. HRD-86-501.
71Henderson,
80

83 Id.
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shortening the statute of limitations for the filing of claims;
revising joint and several liability rules so that defendants are
liable only for their share of the fault being contested and are
not forced to pay all costs ....eliminating double recovery by
preventing defendants from collecting damages from several
sources; limiting or structuring attorneys fees to give injured
parties a larger share of the award and encourage early settlement of large cases; placing reasonable caps on awards for
non-economic damages, such as pain and suffering.Y
Legislative reforms have had some impact on the malpractice crisis, even
though they are incomplete in a number of areas. Reforms which provide
for damage award caps and limitations on attorney's fees may also make
it more difficult for legitimate plaintiffs to find representation.8 5 Legislative reforms also fail to clearly address the patient's interest in "reparation, emotional vindication, and deterrence"8' 6 which are at the root
of malpractice suits.
B. No Fault
A "no fault" system of compensation for medical malpractice, analogous
to the original approach used in the Workers' Compensation system, has
been suggested to be able to handle the malpractice crisis.8 7 No fault
" Korcok, supra note 2, at 846. "No Fault" insurance is also a popular legislative reform and will be discussed in depth later in the paper.
* Attacks on attorney's fees have a long history. Unquestionably the favorite
target of these attacks is the contingent fee agreement. In 1980, the Rand Corporation conducted a study on the effect of contingent fee agreements on litigation.
Opponents of contingent fee agreements maintain that allowing lawyers the right
to finance litigation compels them to "stir up" cases, hoping for lavish financial
rewards. The Rand report disputes this belief stating "the common allegation
that contingent fee agreements induce attorneys to bring claims with little legal
merit has no basis in logic. [To the contrary] the fact that the fee depends on
winning provides an incentive to screen out cases with little merit - an incentive
that is lacking with an hourly fee." RAND COR., Pus. No. R-2458-HCFA Contingent
Fees for PersonalInjury Litigation, at viii (1980). The report also disputed "the

allegation that contingent fees result in excessive (above competition) rewards
for attorneys. Rational allocation of time by the attorney between contingent fee
and hourly rate cases and market competition both act to control fees." Id. at vi.
Available evidence "confirms that, averaging over cases won and lost, the effective
hourly earnings of attorneys paid on a contingent basis are similar to the hourly
earnings of defense attorneys paid by the hour." Id. The report concluded that
"[c]eilings on the contingent fee percentage may significantly reduce the number
of hours an attorney will spend on a case and effectively bar certain cases from
trial.... Restriction on contingent fees would also tend to be regressive, deterring
low- and middle-income plaintiffs from filing even meritorious claims." Id. at vii.
Miller, supra note 7, at 434-35.

One author claims that statistical evidence demonstrates that over 60% of
all the dollars spent on medical malpractice cases are spent to pay legal costs
and attorney's fees. The author also claims that a comparison of expenses under
the present tort system with like costs under the proposed no fault system reveals
a savings of almost 50% under no fault. The injured party also would receive
more net benefits than they do now. Wedekind, An Alternate Proposal for CompensatingInjuries Occurringin the Health CareDelivery System, 29 ALASKA MED.
169 (1987).
17
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schemes compensate accident victims regardless of fault. This system is
similar to a legislative system of justice. No fault schemes have been
instituted in a few countries, notably New Zealand 88 and Sweden. The
health care systems in these countries are markedly different than the
system used in the United States. 8 Nevertheless, in order to consider
adopting the no fault system in the United States, two crucial questions
must be answered: "Which incidents qualify for compensation, [and] who
would be covered by such a scheme?" 9 The answers to these questions
will determine whether no fault is feasible in the United States.
The major criticism of no fault is its failure to control the quality of
service, i.e., the deterrence objective of malpractice litigation. "If the no
fault scheme creates no incentive for the medical profession to take care
and if civil liability is abolished, from where are the incentives and controls to come from?"'9 No fault is also criticized because there would likely
be a marked increase in the number of claims filed if proof of causation
were no longer required.9 2 "Litigation, which entails time, financial costs,
and, most significantly, contact with attorneys, appears to discourage
large numbers of people from seeking redress. If this barrier were removed, there might be a vast reservoir of potential claims against a nofault pool."93 This increased number of claims would absorb, and probably
exceed, any savings the system might provide.
In addition to the criticisms discussed above, no fault would not ensure
that all of a malpractice victim's treatment would be compensated. Insurance companies would decide which illnesses and treatments should
be reimbursed. This would create94 "an incentive for physicians to employ
less preferable treatments for a particular illness merely because that
treatment was not associated with a compensable event."9 5
C. Channeling
Closely related to the no fault compensation scheme is the idea of
"channeling." The theory of "channeling" is to remove the burden of
malpractice liability from a comparably small number of people (physicians) and channel it to either a large number of people (patients) or to
a group of institutions (hospitals) which could more easily absorb the
costs.96

In New Zealand, the Accident Compensation Corporation provides compensation for all injuries, regardless of fault. "Ninety-one percent of its total disbursements go directly to the patient-victim as compared with 28% to 33% of
total insurance disbursements that eventually reach the successful claimants in
medical malpractice and product liability cases under our tort system." Gullickson, Book Review, 257 J. AM. MED. A. 3423 (1987) (reviewing J. O'CONNELL & C.
KELLY, THE BLAME GAME: INJURIES, INSURANCE AND INJUSTICE (1987)).
89
An in depth comparison is beyond the scope of this paper.
90Whelan, supra note 15, at 75.
91
Id.

Permut, supra note 2, at 472-73.
93Meyers, supra note 7, at 1547.
Permut, supra note 2, at 472.
95U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. HRD-s6-5o, supra note 82, at 48.
1 Permut, supra note 2, at 471.
92
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Channeling would require patients to provide their own malpractice
insurance which, in turn, would relieve physicians from malpractice liability.97 Experts who have studied this approach have identified several
major drawbacks. First, poor patients might not be able to afford the
required insurance. 9 Second, this approach is likely to create an even
greater distrust between physicians and patients as physicians will need
to inquire whether a patient has medical malpractice insurance. Consequently, patients may wonder why the physician feels that the insurance is necessary. 'This would create an unprofessional atmosphere for
treatment and might even necessitate having insurance machines in doctors' offices and hospital admitting areas much the same way flight insurance is sold in airports."9 9 Finally, like the no fault system, this
channeling approach has few controls or incentives for medical professionals to provide a high level of care.
A second proposed method of channeling is to require hospitals to provide malpractice insurance for both the hospital and physicians against
any claims resulting from treatment that occurred in the hospital. 1°°
Hospitals are employing this practice more and more to encourage physicians to use their hospital. 0 1 Hospitals then add the cost of malpractice
insurance to the cost of hospitalization on a per diem basis. Physicians
who are covered by the hospital's insurance still need to carry malpractice
coverage for care given in their offices. However, since seventy-five percent of malpractice incidents occur in a hospital, the physician's liability
is greatly reduced.
One benefit of this second channeling approach is that costs are equitably apportioned among different types of patients. Furthermore, hos10 2
pitals can handle the costs more efficiently then physicians or patients.
Hypothetically, patients receiving care through the physician's office
would pay lower costs because of the decreased insurance premiums.
Conversely, hospitalized patients would pay high costs due to the increased costs of malpractice insurance. This method of channeling provides incentives for physicians to provide quality care since hospitals will
institute stronger quality assurance programs. In addition, the threat of
the loss of hospital privileges would guarantee that physicians achieve
an appropriate standard of care. 10 3 Physicians would continue to avoid
malpractice in their offices since they would be responsible for providing
their own insurance for these visits.

10 4

97

1d.
"Id.
MId.
100Id.
101 Finklestein,

102A

supra note 31.

current trend in hospitals is to move into the medical malpractice insurance business. For example, Premier Hospital Alliance, Inc., Westcheser, IL,
recently purchased an insurance firm to underwrite professional liability coverage
for member hospitals, affiliates, and their medical staff. A number of other hospitals have also developed self-insurance funds and captive offshore insurance
companies. Sahney, supra note 2, at 230; Finklestein, supra note 31.
103Permut, supra note 2, at 472.
1
(mId.
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D. Arbitration

Arbitration "is the referral of a dispute by the voluntary agreement of
the parties to one or more impartial arbitrators for a final and binding
decision."'10 5 Arbitrators are generally chosen by the disputing parties and
act as judges although the setting is less formal than in a typical courtroom. Arbitration results may or may not be final. Even where the arbitrator's decision is non-binding, it may strongly influence the party
against whom the decision is made to arrive at a settlement. Presently,
there are several states which by law mandate that medical malpractice
claims for less than a specified amount of money are subject to arbitration.106
The chief benefit of arbitration is that it saves time'0 7 and money as
compared to the overcrowded court system.0 8 Lower medical fees could
be charged to patients to take their malpractice claims to binding arbitration due to the reduced costs. Patients who want to preserve their right
to the traditional court system would pay higher fees.' °9
Authorities cite numerous problems with the use of the arbitration
system in the medical malpractice setting. First, the arbitration agreements themselves are often of questionable validity. One issue that is
commonly litigated is "whether at the time the agreement was entered
into, the recipient, or someone authorized to act for the recipient, was
adequately informed of the relevant implications and was in a position
' 0
to exercise reasonably free choice in the matter.""
This level of knowledge is especially difficult to show when the agreement was signed while
the patient was being admitted to a hospital for treatment. A second
problem with arbitration is that physicians are generally reluctant to
ask patients to sign documents which discuss the consequences should
something go wrong."' A third problem with arbitration is that it may

o5Id. at 465 [quote omitted].
106Id.

107In California, major arbitration cases typically take no more than a year to
go to trial, while typical civil cases take four or five years. Diamond, supra note
78, at § 4, col. 1, at 1.
"os One study revealed that in cases determined by arbitrators, the average
length of the hearing is 2.0 days and the cost of the proceedings, including arbitrators' fees and expenses, administrative expenses, and electronic recordings
of the proceedings, averaged $1,499 per case. Powsner, supra note 8, at 408. The
study also shows that, with the exception of a few special cases, the outcomes of
cases settled in arbitration are virtually the same as in court. Id. at 419. Another
benefit of arbitration is that it can result in better decisions since expert arbitrators are better informed than lay jurors. U.S. GEN. AccT. OFF., PUB. No. HRDs6-50, supra note 79, at 45.
-o One author of this article concludes "[b]ased upon the proposals and experiences of the 1970s and early 1980s, arbitration in combination with channeling
may provide a possible solution to the 'malpractice crisis' of the 1980s and beyond."
Permut, supra note 2, at 473-74.
1 Henderson, supra note 16, at 245.
' Diamond, supra note 78, § 4.
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not decrease the cost of malpractice claims overall. While big claims may
be paid in a smaller percentage of cases, small claims are paid at a slightly
higher rate. 1 2 Finally, arbitration, like litigation, is a win-or-lose system
that fails to address the reason why malpractice claims are initially filed.
Arbitration does not allow the parties to reconcile their differences. 113
E. Review Panels/PretrialScreening Panels
Review panels in the United States generally consist of two types. The
114
first is the medical quality review panel commonly found in hospitals.
The second type of review panel is1 5created by agreements between bar
associations and medical societies.
The objective of medical/law review panels is to provide an alternative
forum to which plaintiffs or physicians can submit claims. These panels
reduce the number of cases which go to trial by screening the cases for
merit, thereby promoting early resolution." 6 Medical/law review panels
are generally comprised of physicians and attorneys who review medical
records and other relevant evidence, consult with needed medical experts,
and determine if medical malpractice caused the patient's injury.1 7 If the
panel finds malpractice has occurred, it encourages settlement. Should
the case go to court, the panel will provide experts who will document
its findings at trial. In contrast, if the panel does not find malpractice, it
encourages dismissal of the claim and will supply experts to support its
position.
The majority of review panels have been unable to achieve the high
level of cooperation between physicians and attorneys which is necessary
for the panel to be productive."18 This level of cooperation is very difficult
to find in both large and small communities.

Id.

112

1-Comment, supra note 32, at 129. The GAO listed several additional disadvantages of arbitration:
1) May allow patients to seek compensation through both arbitration
and the courts when multiple defendants are involved, some of which
have agreed to arbitrate, while other have not. 2) May favor providers
if a provider is part of the arbitration panel and other members defer
to that person for technical expertise. 3) May not adequately compensate injured person. 4) May reduce provider's incentive to reduce
incidence of malpractice due to the private nature of arbitration process versus the public stigma associated with court system. 5) Agreements to arbitrate future malpractice claims may not be fully
understood by patient to the advantage of the providers. 6) Informality
of the arbitration hearings may violate the due process rights of the
parties involved.
U.S. GEN. AcCT.OFF., PUB. No. HRD-86-50, supra note 82, at 45.
114 Permut, supra note 2, at 463.
,,5
Stabenow, Avoiding Patient Complaints? Communicate! Communicate!
Communicate! [interview], 75 IOWA MED. 492 (1985).
,16
U.S. GEN. ACcT. OFF., PUS. No. HRD-86-50, supra note 82, at 44.
117
Permut, supra note 2, at 473.
118Id.
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There are several criticisms of the medical/law review panels. The chief
criticism is that time and money are wasted if the case continues to remain
unsettled after the panel's hearing. Furthermore, review panels tend to
favor the physician as most have a physician who is a member of the
panel. 119 Finally, panels have been unsuccessful because they do not have
the power to enforce their decisions, to discipline doctors, or to change
medical practices and procedures.
VII.

NEW PROPOSALS FOR HANDLING THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS

While current efforts have been somewhat successful, there are many
ways in which the malpractice claims system can be improved. Proposals
for improvements range from expanding the use of alternative dispute
resolution, reformulating the doctor/patient relationship, expanding the
scope of conventional hospital risk management and modifying the manner in which medical malpractice is presently provided. These proposals,
combined with some of the current efforts, would help to resolve the crisis.
A. Rewrite the Physician/PatientRelationship
One proposal for handling the malpractice crisis is to revise the physician/patient relationship. As discussed earlier, in the physician/patient
relationship, the physician generally is viewed as "god-like." While this
god-like status may be helpful in treating patients, it is dangerous as the
patient may have unreasonable expectations. In addition, physician/patient communication is adversely affected. Communication between physicians and patients is especially important because it cultivates a strong
relationship.

120

Physician/patient communication problems have long been recognized
as a major cause of malpractice claims.121 A recent article in the Maryland
Medical Journalnoted:
As early as 1973, 37 percent of malpractice suits in the United
States were the result of poor communication between physician and patient. It was the single most common cause of such
suits. Clearly, the quality of the physician-patient relationship
122
is the most important factor in decreasing medical liability.
119Id. at 475.

120Fortunately, the modern trend in medical education is to concentrate on the
physician/patient relationship from the first day of instruction. Classes in physician-patient communication should be a required part of any medical school
curriculum. Many hospitals also are offering innovative classes on the physician/
patient relationship. Gibbs, supra note 38, at 53. These type of classes should
also be mandatory for practicing physicians. Insurance companies would save
money if they offered incentives to their insured to take these classes.
"I Valente, The Importance of the Physician-PatientCommunication in Reducing Medical Liability, 37 MD. MED. J. 75 (1988).
122Id. at 76 [footnotes omitted].
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If the physician were to communicate the possible outcomes of the proposed treatments, patients would relax when adverse results occur. Failure to fully reveal the possible consequences will later be detrimental to
the physician. 123 Thus, the strong physician/patient relationship is the
24
best prevention against malpractice suits.

In order to re-formulate the classical "doctor/patient relationship," the
physician must be seen as a partner in the relationship rather than as
an unerring, unchallengeable authority. 25 Physicians and patients must
communicate and interact on an equal level and discuss different choices
of treatment. 26 Patients must realize that complications can and do occur.
The common misconception of most patients that everyone can be completely cured or that every surgery has perfect results must be changed.
Physicians should admit their uncertainty and more carefully explain
risks. 127 In essence, the patient and/or family must be presented with
enough information, and in language that is understandable to the patient, to enable them to act as a partner with the physician to manage
the patient's treatment.
A benefit of this new approach is that it allows the patient to share in
the decision-making process. The patient believes that the physician recognizes him not as a child but as an intelligent person capable of making
important decisions. It also allows, the patient to share in the responsibility of unfavorable outcomes.
When complications occur, the physician must be available to truthfully
explain the situation. The physician does not need to say "I made a
mistake,"12 but instead, should explain the problem and the possible
alternatives for treatment. The physician should be sincere and remorse-

Edwards, supra note 57, at 391-92.
'2 Kraushar, supra note 55, at 3. An excellent example of how a strong physician relationship prevents malpractice is the case where malpractice seems
apparent:
Retrospective analysis of this case suggests several areas where one
would strongly suspect physician negligence .... Since no claim was
pressed in this case, we can conclude that the physician/patient relationship was strong enough to negate any feelings of anger on the
part of this patient despite the possibility.., that both the gynecologist and the urologist should have made a different decision.
Avery, Good Rapportand Good Record: Antidote for Litigation, 79 J. TENN. MED.
Assoc. 646 (1986).
125 Rosenberg, Law and Medicine in Confrontation,50 CONN. MED. 471, 472-73
(1986).
128 The medical profession, as a whole, must change the way it treats patients
if the physician is to be seen as a partner. Patients need to be treated in a humane
fashion not "like airline baggage: checked in, weighed, X-rayed, tagged, thrown
on a conveyer belt and forgotten unless it gets lost." Kaufman, supra note 51, at
10.
127Meyers, supra note 7, at 1547.
125This type of statement might later be used as an admission of liability.
123
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ful, and perhaps forgive a fee. 29 Furthermore, the physician should encourage the patient to seek outside consultations. While a physician's
apology for alleged malpractice would ameliorate the patient's anger, the
apology might be regarded as an admission of liability. Hence, it is better
for the physician to wait until the parties are in some type of settlement
situation before offering an apology. 130
B. Comprehensive Internal Dispute-Resolution Systems
As discussed earlier, patients file malpractice claims against doctors
for a number of reasons. Most proposals to resolve the malpractice crisis
fail to address the majority interests of both physician and patient.
Interestingly, in other countries, malpractice claims are not filed as
frequently as in the United States. For example, medical malpractice
claims are filed almost ten times more often in the United States than
in England.13 1 One difference in the countries' two systems is the pronounced legislative and judicial bias against malpractice claims in England. British patients are discouraged from suing because of the "taint"
of litigation. There is also a reduced propensity to sue as medical care is
free due to the socialized medicine system. 13 2 Still, one of the most im-

portant differences in the two systems is the greater number of alternative
forums British patients are given to pursue satisfaction for a medical
service complaint.
Several alternative forums are available in Britain where patients.., can air their grievances or merely seek information.
The mandatory Hospital Complaints Procedure, which handles
complaints about in-patient care, the Health Service Ombudsman, who mediates disputes involving hospital administrative
matters, and the Medical Service Committees, who hear complaints about general practitioners, have no direct analogues
in the United States health care delivery system. Each plays
an important role in defusing patient unhappiness about the
NHS [National Health Service], since each offers a formal process by which patients can bring their concerns to the attention
of authorities who are in the position to obtain information and
to propose improvements. The General Medical Council, which
imposes disciplinary action on errant physicians, provides another forum for hearing complaints, but it performs a function
3
similar to that of state licensing agencies in this country.1
129While this practice would not be practical on a regular basis, a physician
faced with "a poor result and a patient who appears litigious, forgiving that
portion of the fee not covered by insurance may prove a sound investment in the
physician's peace of mind." Kraushar, supra note 58, at 3-4.

130Comment, supra note 32, at 127.
131Miller, supra note 7, at 434-35.
132

Id. at 450.

13

Id. at 454.
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The English alternatives to litigation meet the true interests of most
patients and potential plaintiffs. These grievance forums address patients'
reparation objectives by allowing small payments to injured patients
when appropriate.1 3 4 The English system also provides avenues for patients to affect change in physician behavior. Consequently, patients gain
emotional vindication, as well as deter future negligent conduct by the
physicians. 135 The United States would make great progress toward resolving its malpractice crisis if it created alternative forums to meet these
interests.
1. AMA Proposal to Create an Alternative System
In 1988 the American Medical Association (AMA) proposed an alternative to the present tort system to reduce medical malpractice claims.136
The AMA based its proposal on two facts. First, the existing judicial
system is unfair to patients because not all injured patients can acquire
legal representation. Second, the system is unfair to physicians because
lay jurors are not qualified to decide malpractice cases and as a result,
3 7
their awards tend to be excessive.

The AMA proposal calls for replacing the present court and jury system
with an administrative claims tribunal. Medical malpractice disputes
would be adjudicated before an expert administrative agency that would
either be newly created, or be a modified version of present state licensing
boards. Under the AMA plan, malpractice complaints would be evaluated
by an expert administrative agency that would try to assist 3 8 the parties
in reaching a settlement and/or determine the merits of the case. 139 The
4

13

Id. at 456 [footnotes omitted].

135Id.

at 461.
Med., Specialty Soc'y Med. Liability Project, A ProposedAlternative to

""Am.

the Civil Justice System for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A Fault-Based,
Administrative System (1988) [hereinafter A Proposed Alternative].

Id. at ii.
13When claims are first filed, the agency decides if a claim has merit, thereby
operating as a pretrial screening panel.
The administrative claims system would work in the following way:
The administrative system for adjudicating medical liability [would]
be divided into three parts: (1) the pre-hearing and initial hearing
stage; (2) the final decision of the Board; and (3) judicial review ....
Under proposed pre-hearing procedures, claims reviewers from the
Medical Board will quickly evaluate claims and dismiss those without
merit. For claims with merit, the claims reviewers will submit the
137

matter to an expert in the same field as the health care provider. The

expert will review the claim and make a judgment as to whether it
has merit. The claims reviewer will also assist in evaluating the claim
and any settlement offers. If the claim is not settled it will be assigned
to one of the Medical Board's hearing examiners .... The hearing
examiner [will have broad authority over discovery and the hearing.]
... The hearing examiner will be required to render a written decision

within 90 days of the hearing... . The hearings examiner's decision

is subject to review by the Medical Board [on appeal] ... . Appeal
from the Medical Board's decision will be to the intermediate appellate

court of the state, where the review will be limited to whether the

Board acted contrary to statute or the Board's own rules.
A ProposedAlternative, supra note 136, at ii-iii.

1989-90]

RESOLVING THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS

43

proposal also empowers the administrative agency to discipline doctors
40
who demonstrate a pattern of substandard conduct.
While the AMA's proposal is commendable, it is somewhat shortsighted.
As discussed earlier, patients sue because they are angry or surprised by
unanticipated outcomes, not because they have evidence that their physician was negligent.14 1 Suits are generally not filed against incompetent
physicians but against qualified doctors, "most of whom have never been
sued before and have received excellent peer review reports. ' 42
Like the litigation process, the AMA proposal fails to address the societal objectives of malpractice litigation: reparation, emotional vindication, and deterrence.143 The system might be quick and efficient, but it
overlooks the patient's interests and resolves disputes in a problematic
win-or-lose fashion. Patients and their families would not feel vindicated
or compensated for their own or their relatives' illness, injury, or death.
In addition, they would feel unable to protect others from harm. Lastly,
the AMA administrative system would limit the ability of the doctor and
patient to reach a settlement that satisfies both of their interests. Thus,
the AMA proposal needs to be expanded before it should be placed into
practice.
2. Third Party Facilitation
Another alternative to the present malpractice system is the use of a
medical malpractice third party facilitator who would serve as a mediator/
ombudsman. 144 This facilitator could be used either in conjunction with
or independent of the AMA administrative agency. People from both the
legal and medical communities would comprise the facilitator's office. The
malpractice third party facilitators would investigate complaints filed by
patients, physicians, or hospitals, and then mediate a settlement between
the parties. Mediation, as used here, is a process where the disputants,
together with "assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically
isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives,
and reach consensual settlement that will accommodate their needs."'14 .

Mediation tends to diffuse hostilities by fostering cooperation.
140 An additional part of the AMA proposal would change the rule governing
the standard of care a physician owes to a patient. The standard of care "based
on custom and locality would be abolished in favor of a standard that focuses on
whether the challenged actions fall within a range of reasonableness, to be determined by reference to the standards of a prudent and competent practitioner

in the same or similar circumstances." Id. at vii. The rule of joint and several

liability also would be abolished under the AMA proposal so that defendants
would be liable for damages in proportion to their actual liability. Id. at vii.
141
142

Heed Consumers, supra note 56, at 64.

Id.

Miller, supra note 7, at 435.
- See generally, Waxman, A NonlitigationalApproach to Conflict Resolution:
The Medical Center as a Model, 42 ARBITRATION JOURNAL 25 (1987).
145 Comment, supra note 32, at 129 [quotation marks and footnotes omitted].
141
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In practice, the third party facilitator would investigate the claim and
then bring the patient and physician together and attempt to resolve the
dispute. The facilitator also would help the parties recognize their interests and would work with them to generate options and possible solutions
to :their conflict. If the dispute can be resolved without legal action, it
will save the parties time and money. Even if the parties are unable to
come to an agreement, they will have a better understanding of their
opponent's position.
Mediation has several disadvantages. One danger of using mediation
with physicians and patients is the imbalance of power. Furthermore,
statements made during the course of mediation might be used later in
court. If lawyers accompany both parties in the mediation session, the
foregoing problems might be overcome. Although attorneys tend to be
adversarial, they are often good negotiators. The presence of an attorney
would also limit patient intimidation by physicians during mediation. In
addition, attorneys would ensure that any statements made during mediation would be considered offers of compromise, and therefore would be
inadmissible in court.
Another possible solution, never suggested before for use in medical
malpractice disputes, is the "med-arb" or "conferencing" approach which
is used in labor law cases. 14 Med-arb, as its name suggests, is a combination of mediation and arbitration. An arbitrator, *ho is empowered to
decide the dispute, attempts to involve the parties in dispute resolution
through informal mediated meetings. The arbitrator's hope is that the
parties will reach a satisfactory agreement. 147 If the parties fail to reach
an agreement, the arbitrator, as a last resort, will exercise his power to
resolve the dispute. "The arbitrator has considerable authority and control. Thus, if the arbitrator suggests a caucus to confer with the opposing
[parties and/or] lawyers, they will usually agree."'14 In the private caucus,
the mediator/arbitrator has an assortment of tactics 149 available for encouraging the patient and physician to negotiate and reach an agreement
that satisfies both of their interests.
Lawyers are useful in a variety of ways in mediation or med-arb. The
patient's lawyer would equalize the power between the parties. Furthermore, the presence of an attorney would influence the patient to mediate
rather than litigate as he will have an increased sense of security. The
physician's attorney would encourage the physician to be flexible and
remind her that, "You've got to pick and choose your fights carefully and
ask yourself, is this one worth fighting?"' 90 Lawyers would also serve as
" McKersie, Tis Better to Confer than to Decide, 3 NEGOTIATION JouRNAL 32932 (1987).
14The settlement could be as simple as an apology from the doctor.
I McKersie, supra note 146, at 329.

49 The arbitrator could use likely arbitral outcomes as a persuasive tactic to
encourage the parties to reach an accord. This information would decrease the

parties' uncertainty about failing to reach an agreement and would place each
in a better position to negotiate and come to an agreement.
150Porter, supra note 81, at 402 [quotation marks omitted].
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sources of information. For example, they could explain applicable standards, probable trial outcomes and transaction costs for each case.
The role of negotiator is another role which could be filled by an attorney. In cases where the imbalance of power is a problem, or the parties
have a distaste for negotiation, lawyers could conduct the entire negotiation. Finally, the presence of lawyers will make it easier for the parties
to speak freely as they could stipulate that the mediation discussions are
considered to be offers of compromise and thus assure confidentiality.
Physicians could apologize within this forum without fear that the apology would later be used as an admission of liability. Studies have shown
that some patient/plaintiffs feel that their injuries can only be repaired
151
by the physician's apology.
C. Broaden the Scope of Classical Risk Management
Beginning in July of 1988, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH) required hospitals to maintain risk management programs. 152 Classically, risk management services are set up to identify and
reduce causes of "potentially compensable events."'153 In other words, risk
management departments determine where losses are occurring, identify
them for hospital management, and thus reduce them. Side rails for
hospital beds and wristband identification are two examples of risk management control and loss prevention innovations.'5 Risk management
data also has caused some hospitals to limit their obstetric services because of potential loss. 55
Risk management services may exist in-house or may be provided by
outside consulting services. The scope of services provided by the risk
management department is determined largely by the hospital's malpractice carrier. Insurance companies traditionally limit the scope of such
services. Insurance companies recognize that most patients will not sue.
Guided by money concerns, insurance companies generally take the oldfashioned approach of waiting until they receive a "Notice of Intent to
Sue," rather than authorizing the risk management department to expend
funds to mollify an upset patient or family. 56 As more and more hospitals
have become either totally or partially self-insured, risk management
departments have taken on much broader roles. 57 The control exercised
Comment, supra note 32, at 127.
Richman, HospitalsExplore Innovative Techniques to Prevent Litigation and
Hold Down Costs, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 8, 1987 (special section).
153

Id.

Christensen, 0. Lindgren, & D.H. Mills, Prediction and Prevention of
Medical Malpractice Claims, Institute for Medical Research Studies 31 (Proceedings of the Research Conference on Health Care Improvement and Medical Liability, April 27, 1988) (sponsored by the U.S. Dept. Health and Human Service).
15 Telephone interview with Janet Schmitt, Associate Director - Risk Management, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, California (Jan. 27, 1989).
156Control of insurance companies over the health care providers risk management departments is discussed extensively infra.
161Sahney, supra note 2, at 230; Finklestein, supra note 31; U.S. GEN. ACCT.
OFF.. PUB. No. HaD-S6-5o, supra note 82, at 67.
114 R.
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by risk management departments may range from forgiving fees owed,
to directing the actions of defense attorneys. 51 8
One particularly successful and innovative risk management program
is run by the Professional Risk Management Group (PRM). 169 PRM is a
consulting firm that contracts with hospitals to provide risk management
services.'r* "PRM's program stresses the importance of an effective incident-reporting system, timely and intensive investigation of incidents,
vigorous defense when indicated, innovative settlements, and data feed0
back."' '
As discussed earlier, the medical profession has always been worried
about malpractice. Most physicians and nurses practicing today did not
attend schools where classes on malpractice or law were offered. 16 2 Medical care providers often view malpractice suits as personal attacks on
their competence.' 3 Unfortunately, rather than confronting potential
malpractice claims before litigation ensues, the medical profession's classic reaction, like that of insurance companies, is to ignore these claims
until the patient initiates a lawsuit.'6
PRM works with medical practitioners to demystify the medical malpractice process. PRM conducts continuing education sessions for all physicians, nurses, and other medical staff. These classes outline the early
reporting mechanism and stress the importance of early reporting. Medical staff are taught not to be afraid of the "malpractice boogie man"1 65
as the PRM system is designed to be nonpunitive. Physicians are assured
that every effort will be "made to support them and other involved staff
members in any suits filed, and that whenever possible, claims will be
settled out of court. In this way, the time physicians must spend giving
166
depositions or testifying in court [is] reduced significantly."'
To aid in early reporting, PRM provides a twenty-four-hour-a-day,
seven-days-a-week, telephone hot line so that medical incidents can be
reported instantly. Medical staff are told only to report incidents, while

156An informal survey of a number of California hospitals illustrates this point.
Personal or telephone interviews were conducted with: Janet Schmitt, Associate
Director - Risk Management Department, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center; Doug
Pinnui, Director - Risk Management and Loss Control Department, Sharp Health
Care; Susan Finklestein, Account Executive, Professional Risk Management,
University of California at San Diego; Frank D. Heckman, Senior Vice President
- Professional Risk Management Group (which provides risk management services
to the five University of California Medical Centers), University of Southern
California Medical Center, Drew Medical Center, San Bernadino County Medical
Center, and Stanford Medical Center.
159 McNulty, Director Patient Settlements Best for All Parties, HOSPITALS, May
1, 1990 at 129.
160 See supra note 158 for a list of PRM hospitals.
61 McNulty, supra note 159, at 129.
162Cavalier, Strong Medicine, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 7, 1986, at 63.
161Wilbert, Coping with the Stress of MalpracticeLitigation, 171 ILL. MED. J.
23, 25 (1987).
11 Heckman, supra note 67; Finklestein, supra note 31.
161 Heckman, supra note 67.
'6 McNulty, supra note 159, at 129.
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the evaluation will be conducted by PRM. 167 This approach is proactive.
"We take control of the events rather than be effected by them."168 When
an incident is reported, by telephone or in writing, the investigation is
initiated.' The PRM administrator, who directs risk management at the
reporting hospital, then chooses and directs the course of action selected.
The following is an illustration of the PRM system. A pregnant patient's
delivery is not progressing properly and the doctor decides to do a routine
Caesarean section. The patient and her husband are warned of the dangers associated with the surgery, but trust the doctor and agree to the
surgery. During the operation, the anesthesiologist makes a mistake. The
baby is delivered successfully, but the patient is now in a coma. Upon
receiving a report of this incident, the PRM administrator would take
the following steps: (1) Identify the issues: "What are they [the patient
and family] contending with here? People often try to solve problems that
don't exist."170 ; and (2) Analyze the issues: This analysis is similar to a
triangle approach. The administrator deals with the most important issues first within the constraint of presently available resources (i.e., doctors, nurses, social workers, etc. presently on hand). The objective is to
help the patient or the patient's family deal first with the most important
issues. For example, the husband may not understand why he cannot see
his wife. The PRM administrator will arrange for a member of the medical
team to explain why, and to explain when the husband can see her; (3)
Initiate the investigation at the hospital to determine what transpired;
(4) Execute the indicated actions.
After evaluating the situation, the administrator would quickly decide
who should contact the family'17 to discuss the problem and possible
solutions. The doctor, anesthesiologist, and nurses involved are most
likely upset, and thus should not meet with the family. Nevertheless, it

1"7The medical staff is instructed to report any incident where an "untold,
unforeseen, or unexpected result occurs."
16 Heckman, supra note 67.
169 PRM, who pioneered the extensive use of computerized incident reporting,
has a very extensive computer data-bank that allows administrators to evaluate
which cases could include an element of fault. In addition to helping the administrators spot possible fault, the computer data bank allows PRM to spot incident
patterns and take corrective action. For example, a rise in injuries to the collarbone of newborns was traced to an improper technique taught by an instructor.

Students ofithis instructor were then given a remedial class. Cavalier, supra note
162, at 61; R. Christensen, et. al., supra note 154, at 32. Presently, the Institute

for Medical Risk Studies, a nonprofit institute which is the research arm of PRM,
is working on a 3-year grant in which it is examining ways to improve malpractice
"incident-reporting and occurrence-screening systems ...used to provide early

identification, investigation, and resolution of potential malpractice claims." Id.
at 33.
170 Heckman, supra note 67.
171In

our hypothetical, someone would need to meet with the husband im-

mediately. They would need to deal with his immediate and tangential concerns
about his wife. For instance, a neighbor may be watching his children only for
the night: What will he do with them tomorrow or even next week?
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is important that the family be given a "fair and unbiased opinion without
delay. They need to be given the information about what has occurred
and the skills to deal with this information. Families fear the unknown.' ' 72 Hence, the PRM administrator would likely assign the most
senior staff physician, an anesthesiologist, other than the one involved,
and a social worker to talk to the family. Frequently, the PRM admin73
istrator accompanies these medical professionals to the family meeting.
The PRM administrator would also evaluate the family's concerns. For
example, the family may have concerns about the payment of medical
bills. 174 The PRM administrator has the power to authorize the hospital

to hold or cancel the patient's hospital and other medical bills. Furthermore, the administrator has the power to arrange for the hospital to pay
for the patient's follow-up care. Additionally, the administrator has wide
discretion in handling the claim which may range from hiring a babysitter to watch the family's children, to paying for the hotel rooms of outof-town relatives who come to see the patient. In short, the PRM administrator may take any creative action that will improve the situation.
After the initial crisis has ended, the administrator continues to monitor several aspects of the case. The administrator must oversee additional
treatment and decide whether to bill the patient and/or family. The administrator must also take continuing steps to defuse the anger of the
patient and family.
PRM's approach is designed to resolve cases quickly. If the administrator's analysis indicates that the hospital is liable, the administrator
contacts the patient or family. The administrator's objective is to negotiate
and settle the case. PRM's method "clears the air" by having doctors
admit mistakes. 175 The aim is to give the patient the 'test and fairest
compensation arrangement possible."' 7 PRM has found in the development of its program that prompt and complete disclosure of injuries coupled with generous settlement offers have produced more cooperative
patients and less costly claims. PRM discovered that when they were
172
173

Heckman, supra note 67.
Id.

Our hypothetical situation obviously contains a very traumatic event. Beyond the family's initial concerns about what has happened to their loved one,
the family has other important concerns: "What really happened? What will
happen? Who is going to pay for this? Who's going to take care of our children?
etc." One hospital administrator outlined how she creatively worked with one
aggrieved family. In this situation, the grandfather had gone into the hospital
for surgery. Due to a mistake in surgery, the grandfather became a quadriplegic.
Prior to surgery, the grandfather had been the family babysitter, watching his
grandchildren while his daughter was at work. The single working mother now
had to deal with finding someone she could trust and afford to watch her children.
Thus, she was suddenly forced to deal with a very important parallel issue other
than those just concerning her father. This type of concern is largely ignored by
traditional risk management departments. In this situation, however, the risk
management administrator immediately helped the mother by sending a nurse
from the hospital to baby-sit the children- This was done prior to the determination
of any liability. As part of the final settlement of the case, a baby-sitter was
supplied until the children no longer needed one.
171 Cavalier, supra note 162, at 63.
176Finklestein, supra note 31.
171
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humanistic, they tended to save more money. "The earlier the reporting,
the earlier the identification, the earlier the investigation, the earlier the
77
1
resolution-the happier the outcome.'

If the administrator is unable to settle the case and the patient retains
an attorney, PRM cooperatively contacts opposing counsel to "find out
what his needs are. Harassing the patient's attorney widens the gap and
hardens the sides. 1 78 If liability or damages are at issue, PRM pays an
outside private physician to evaluate the patient. This physician, by stipulation, cannot be called as an expert.
PRM's approach to discovery "is to get all the facts out early so that
both sides can properly evaluate the case."'179 The objectives of the evaluation process are to deal with the merits of the case and to discover the
"hidden agendas" of the patient, family members, and the patient's attorney. For example, the patient's family and attorney may think of the
medical incident as their path to riches. Generally, the merits of the case
are rapidly addressed while other agendas dominate the process. s0
In a typical medical malpractice case, defense attorneys for the physician's insurance company control the flow of litigation. Insurance lawyers generally must bill a set number of hours each year which may
create an incentive to perform unnecessary legal work. To counter this
incentive, PRM controls the flow of litigation. PRM administrators work
closely with defense counsel to reduce litigation costs. They also have
authority to negotiate directly with the patient's attorney. If PRM determines the claim to be meritless, they will allow it to go to court. This
willingness to fight meritless claims discourages frivolous lawsuits.
PRM's clients (mostly self-insured hospitals) must make yearly payments into a trust account which PRM manages and uses for settlements.
No profits are made from these accounts and there is no incentive for an
administrator to retain these funds.
PRM designs the settlement of a claim to fit the patient's needs as much
as possible. 8' Throughout the settlement process, the PRM administrator
generates creative alternatives to the classic lump sum payment which
is typically used to settle claims. 182 If the injured party requires on-going
medical care, the hospital's services are offered as part of the settlement.
If the patient chooses not to use the hospital's facilities, the money is
placed in a trust account to pay for future medical care. After a specified
number of years, money which is not used for the patient's medical care
reverts to the hospital. Hence, PRM's program meets the patient's needs
and lowers medical malpractice costs.

Id.

177

I'8 Heckman, supra note 67.
179Id.

'8 Id.

181McNulty,

supra note 159, at 130.
Creative settlements have ranged from creating college trust fund accounts
for the patient's children, to hiring a baby-sitter to watch the family's children.
182
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As a result of PRM's progressive approach, PRM's transaction costs are
substantially reduced. For example, insurance companies not using this
approach report that out of every dollar spent in a malpractice claim the
patient's attorney receives 16 cents, defense counsel receives 60 cents,
and the injured party receives only 24 cents. Thus, 76 cents out of every
dollar goes toward attorney fees.
In contrast, under PRM's approach, patient's counsel receives 30 cents,
the defense counsel receives 25 cents, and the injured party receives 45
cents of every dollar. Hence, transaction costs are reduced by 24 cents on
every dollar. In addition, these figures do not take into account the fact
that claims against PRM clients are generally settled much earlier than
traditional malpractice claims. "Claims are settled earlier and more effectively without just giving cash away."'
PRM's approach provides for fair patient compensation. In addition, an
environment is created where physicians can admit mistakes. Finally,
patients know that PRM will take action to assume that these types of
incidents will not recur. In essence, PRM's approach effectively addresses
all of the injured patient's interests of reparation, vindication, and deterrence.
The successful use of progressive approaches in handling medical malpractice claims is by no means limited to PRM. Many hospital risk management departments and private consulting firms have adopted some of
the PRM methods. 18 4 Nevertheless, the majority of hospitals continue to
limit the scope of their risk management departments solely to the identification of potentially compensable events. A number of obstacles must
be surmounted before the role of risk management programs can be broadened to better handle medical malpractice claims in a progressive PRMlike approach. The first obstacle is the resistance of the medical field to
the risk management concept in general. As one writer concluded:
[s]elling risk management as an integral component of hospital
operations has always been difficult. Since many clinicians
view the quality assurance program (which is usually clinically
based) as an unnecessary overlay of committees and paperwork
that is grudgingly accomplished only to receive accreditation
from the Joint Commission [on Accreditation of Hospitals], the
startup of a risk management program (which is usually legally
oriented) faces a bruising gauntlet. 185
Another obstacle which has delayed the use of the PRM-like approaches
is the different interests of the insurance company compared to the interests of the health care provider and the patient. 18 6 Because insurance
companies have a profit motive, they will invest the money to increase
13 Heckman, supra note 67.
I" Schmitt, supra note 155; Interview with Doug Pinnui, Director, Risk Man-

agement and Loss Control Department, Sharp HealthCare (1989).
"I Warren, Book Review, 13 J. OF HEALTH
"1

POL.,

POL'Y AND L. 365, 369 (1988).

This statement excludes health care providers who are self-insured since

their interests should be similar.
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profits, and consequently, delay settlement. This delay weakens the patient's case as witnesses' memories will become less clear and it is difficult
to retain these witnesses for long periods. 187 In essence, the original malpractice claim, which was essentially a people problem, is treated like
and becomes a financial concern. While health care providers clearly have
an incentive to settle malpractice claims and avoid bad publicity, such
as headlines that read "Big City Hospital Refuses to Pay Damages for
Brain Damaged Baby", insurance companies are less affected by unfavorable publicity.
The present malpractice insurance system allows the interests of the
insurance carrier to dominate. Insurance companies wait and see whether
they will be sued and limit the scope of risk management services as they
hope to pay nothing to the patient. As a result, progressive risk management services are not widely utilized, and patients and health care
providers bear the loss. Patient and physician interests can only be addressed if risk management services are expanded. The present systems
of malpractice insurance must be modified to allow for progressive risk
management.
D. Modify the Way Medical MalpracticeInsurance is Provided
Health care providers typically protect themselves from medical malpractice claims by purchasing medical malpractice insurance. Malpractice insurance is sold by several different types of insurance companies:
commercial insurance companies; health care provider-owned companies
(i.e., mutual insurance companies); and joint underwriting associations
(JUA).1m For a fee, the insurance company assumes financial responsibility for injuries to any patient limited to a specific amount of money
and for a set time period.18 9 The insurance company also investigates
claims and defends the health care provider against a malpractice action.
As stated above, the scope of services provided by risk management
departments is limited largely by the hospital's malpractice carrier. Although the interests of patients and health care providers should be addressed first, the interests of the insurance company dominates. Changing
how the present medical malpractice insurance is provided would remedy
this situation. One method would be to modify and expand the present
use of mutual insurance companies and joint underwriting associations. 1°

187
Conventional wisdom in the insurance industry is to hide injuries and deny
fault. Cavalier, supra note 162, at 61.
U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., PUB. No. HRD.86-50, supra note 82, at 66.
188

188Id.
', Joint Underwriting Association and Physician/Hospital Mutual Companies
were products of the mid-seventies medical malpractice crisis. Hatch, supra note
10, at 2.
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Joint underwriting associations are nonprofit pooling arrangements created by state legislatures to provide medical malpractice insurance to health care providers in the states in
which they are established ....

Joint underwriting associa-

tions are established on the premise that they will be selfsupporting through the premiums collected; however, laws establishing the associations generally provide that policyholders
can be assessed, up to a specified amount, for deficits experienced by the association. JUA's (joint underwriting associations) generally are comprised of all companies writing
insurance in a particular state or all companies writing property/casualty insurance in a state and are controlled by a group
of public and private sector representatives. The purpose of
JUA is to write liability insurance for health care providers
who are unable to obtain coverage in the private market.' 9'
Physician/hospital mutual insurance companies are owned by the insured. In other words, the mutual company is controlled by its physician
or hospital members. These insurance companies were created because
analysts believed that doctor/hospital nonprofit companies would issue
more affordable insurance to physicians and hospitals than the traditional
malpractice carriers. 192 In a mutual company each member contributes
"to a fund for the payment of the losses and expenses.., the relationship
between the members being a dual one, in that each member is in a sense
both an insured and an insurer."'193 Mutual companies require payments
on the basis of cash premiums, premium notes, assessments, or a mixture
of these.194 The company's assets are trust funds comprised of the premium
95

payments.1

Mutual insurance companies and joint underwriting associations have
provided both malpractice insurance at a slightly lower cost, and insurance for those who are unable to obtain it in the private market. Nonetheless, mutual companies and JUA's generally handle malpractice
claims in a traditional fashion. 196 Once an incident is reported or a claim
is filed, the association or mutual company investigates and defends the
hospital in much the same way as private malpractice insurance companies. The risk management departments of the JUA or the mutual
insured health care providers are limited. Progressive approaches in dealing with potential claims are largely ignored.
The failure of JUAs and mutual insurance companies to adopt the
successful methods of risk management companies like PRM in handling
malpractice claims is unreasonable. JUAs and mutual companies could
modify their charters and bylaws to allow expansion of insureds' risk
I'l U.S.

GEN. ACcT. OFF., PuB. No. HRD-SS-S0, supra note 82, at 67.
102Hatch, supra note 10, at 2.
at 3.
15 Id.

Couch on Insurance § 19:14 (2d rev. ed. 1988) [footnotes omitted].
Id. at § 19:18.
'MId. at § 19:24.

'
9
'
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management department operations. These companies could set guidelines in their charters and bylaws which limit which hospitals to admit
as members to those that adopt progressive risk management approaches. 197 Risk management administrators could help tailor management decisions by serving on the board of directors of the companies.
Alternatively, hospitals with similar attitudes toward malpractice
could pool their money into trust accounts to create their own insurance
companies. A stipulated amount of money would be placed into the account by each hospital. The trust account would work along the same
lines as a "claims made insurance policy,"1981 i.e., only those claims reported during the period when the trust account was in effect and would
be covered by the money in the account. Members would be assessed for
any deficits experienced by the company.
Hospitals with historically lower malpractice costs could contribute less
to the trust account. Members' contributions could be adjusted annually
based on the length of time they are members and their malpractice
costs. 199 Thus, the members of these limited non-profit companies would
pool their resources to provide both low cost insurance and progressive
approaches to handle malpractice. This scheme could be slightly modified
by hiring outside professional risk management groups, like PRM, to
provide risk management services.
Another possible system of insurance coverage would be to have health
care providers contract with existing mutuals, JUAs and commercial
insurance companies, to set up interest earning trust accounts. The insurance company would establish a ratio, based on the hospital's past and
estimated malpractice costs, to determine the amount which the hospital
must deposit for a certain amount of coverage. For example, for every
$100,000 the hospital places into the trust account, the insurance com-

197 One recent study indicates that mutual insurance companies are more efficient than commercial insurance companies. The study found that St. Paul
Companies, Inc. (the largest commercial insurer in the malpractice market) "spent
on an average more than twice as much in allocated loss adjustment expenses
per claim" compared to the mutual insurance company (MMIE). Hatch, supra
note 10, at 29. In addition, St. Paul "paid a higher average loss per claim, one
and one half times the average loss payment of MMIE." Id. St. Paul also took a
longer time to close a claim. For example, in 1986 and 1987, MMIE closed approximately 20% more total claim files than did St. Paul. Id.
Couch, supra note 194, at § 19:30 [footnotes omitted].
1 Traditionally, medical malpractice insurance was offered in the form of an
occurrence-based policy. With occurrence-based insurance, the transfer of the risk
from the hospital to the insurance company took place when the incident occurred.
In malpractice cases a great deal of time often passes between the occurrence of
the malpractice and the settlement of the claim. This made it difficult for insurance companies to make accurate actuarial measures to determine the malpractice loss for a set period. To reduce some of these difficulties the 1970's malpractice
crisis produced the "claims made policy". A claims made policy provides that the
transfer of risk occurs only when the claim or incident is reported to the insurance
carrier. Currently, 70-80% of written malpractice insurance policies are "claimsmade" policies. Hatch, supra note 10, at 3.
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pany would deposit $1,000,000. The director of the hospital's risk management department would be a trustee of the trust account. After a
specified period of time, the money remaining in the trust account would
revert to the insurance company. This amount would usually exceed the
amount originally placed into the account so the insurance company
2
would receive a net profit . 00
The trustee of the trust account would be under a fiduciary duty not
to waste the corpus of the trust. The risk management administrator or
trustee would also have an added incentive not to waste the corpus because the future hospital/insurance company ratio could be changed to
be less favorable to the hospital. As a further incentive for the administrator or trustee, the hospital could receive a percentage of the corpus
after the trust period ends.
These options minimize the profit incentive by modifying the manner
in which malpractice insurance is provided. This gives the hospital risk
management more autonomy to prevent, react to, and properly deal with
medical malpractice incidents. Hospital risk management departments
could adopt and improve on the model used by PRM. Early reporting,
early identification, early investigation, and early resolution result in a
happier outcome and go a long way toward reducing the "costs" of the
medical malpractice crisis.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Unfortunately, breakthroughs in the malpractice crisis are often slowed
by finger pointing. Physicians tend to blame the malpractice crisis on
lawyers. "Yet to focus on lawyers as a primary cause of rising malpractice
costs is to deny that physicians' errors actually generate malpractice
suits." 0 1 Physicians' fail to recognize the leading causes of malpractice
claims: the breakdown in physician/patient communications, and the perception of patients that they are uninformed and that physicians are
uncaring or not sincerely remorseful for negative outcomes. 2 2 Furthermore, it is important to recall that the majority of people who have suf20 3
fered an iatrogenic injury do not discuss their injuries with lawyers.
Once lawyers are contacted, however, the physician/patient relationship changes. Lawyers, who see the physician and patient as adversaries, 204 envision themselves as the champions who will fight their clients'
200Couch, supra note 194, at § 19:40 [footnotes omitted].
201A formula would need to be established to determine the trust account

contributions of the hospital and insurance company. This would ensure that the
insurance company would generally make a profit. In a bad year, where a high
number of claims are filed, the insurance company would get no return on its
money. If the amount placed in the trust account is insufficient to cover claims,
then the health care provider and the insurance company would be assessed the
excess in the pre-existing ratio.
202

Korcok, supra note 2, at 846-47.

Valente, supra note 121, at 75-76.
204Meyers, supra note 7, at 1547.
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battles in court. The doctor or patient becomes the enemy. Clients are
told to refrain from all direct contact with the other party, opposing
counsel and officers of the court. In their fervor to guard their clients and
prepare for litigation, attorneys thwart "any opportunity for an apology
and reconciliation. '20 5 Consequently, the patient/plaintiff who wins the
legal battle generally receives money damages, but his true interests are
6
overlooked.

20

Although lawyers are partly to blame for the malpractice crisis, solutions which solely alter the lawyers' involvement are a mistake. Instead,
it is important to examine the underlying objectives of reparation, emotional vindication, and deterrence which convert a patient into a plaintiff.
The present tort system fails to address these objectives. In effect, solutions to the medical malpractice crisis must entail a broad based approach
that addresses these interests.
Legislative reforms can partially resolve the malpractice crisis. "Channeling" malpractice insurance through hospitals will help to reduce some
costs. The AMA's proposal for creating an alternative forum to resolve
claims is commendable though shortsighted as it adopts too many of the
weaknesses of the present tort system.
While everyone agrees that the interests of patients and health care
providers should be addressed, the insurance companies' interests currently dominate. Sources of malpractice insurance should be modified to
allow for more progressive risk management. Risk management must be
allowed to properly address both the patient's and health care provider's
interests. This would substantially lower the number of claims filed and
the cost of settling claims.
Other important steps necessary in order to solve this crisis are to
rewrite the physician/patient relationship and to create an alternative
forum where the parties can reach agreement (e.g., third party facilitation). Communication between physicians and patients must improve.
Malpractice carriers, HMOs, and hospitals should require their physicians to attend occasional seminars on physician/patient communication.
The physician must be seen as a partner in the relationship rather than
as an unerring, unchallenged authority.
When the physician/patient relationship breaks down, the use of a third
party facilitator should be encouraged. Physicians and patients must be
brought together to try and resolve their differences. Attorneys should
be allowed to accompany the parties at the meeting with the third party
facilitator.
A consensual agreement is likely to be consistent with the interests
and preferences of both parties. Both parties will come out "winners."
The result will be fewer malpractice claims, less defensive medicine, lower
malpractice insurance premiums, lower medical costs, and a rise in the
quality of health care; all very worthy ends.
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Comment, supra note 32, at 128.
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